We introduce a new underlying problem for computational cryptographic schemes secure against quantum adversaries. The problem is a distinction problem between quantum states which is a natural generalization of distinction problems between probability distributions, which are commonly used in computational cryptography. Specifically speaking, our problem QSCD ff is defined as a quantum state computational distinguishability problem between random coset states with a hidden permutation and a maximally mixed state (uniform distribution) over the symmetric group. A similar problem to ours appears in the context of the hidden subgroup problem on the symmetric group in the research of quantum computation and is regarded as a hard problem. In this paper, we show that (i) QSCD ff has the trapdoor property; (ii) the average-case complexity of QSCD ff completely coincides with its worst-case complexity; (iii) the computational complexity of QSCD ff is lower-bounded by the worst-case hardness of the graph automorphism problem. These properties enable us to construct cryptographic systems. Actually, we show a cryptographic application based on the hardness of QSCD ff .
Introduction
Since Diffie and Hellman [9] utilized a computationally intractable problem to establish a key exchange protocol, computational cryptography has been extensively investigated. They also invented the notion of one-way functions. Many kinds of theoretical cryptographic systems (e.g., pseudorandom generators, bit commitment schemes, and digital signature schemes) are shown to be constructed by using one-way functions. On the other hand, candidates for one-way functions are not known so much. Many concrete cryptographic systems are based on the hardness of either the integer factorization problem or the discrete logarithm problem. Besides these major problems, the following problems are utilized: the quadratic residuosity problem, the Diffie-Hellman problem, the subset sum (or, knapsack) problem, the shortest vector problem, the principal ideal problem, and so on. For the above problems, we have not found any efficient classical algorithms.
If we concede that an adversary can use "quantum computers", the adversary can efficiently solve the integer factorization problem (and quadratic residuosity problem) [31] , the discrete logarithm problem (and Diffie-Hellman problem) [6, 19, 31] , and the principal ideal problem [15] . This quantum adversary would also crack several concrete cryptosystems based on the hardness of these problems.
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard [4] invented a key distribution protocol via quantum channel called quantum key distribution scheme, which was later shown to be (quantum) information theoretically secure. Mayers [25] and Lo and Chau [23] independently demonstrated that the quantum mechanics cannot necessarily make any cryptographic schemes information theoretically secure by giving proofs for the impossibility of the quantum bit commitment schemes with information theoretically concealing and binding. Thus, computational approaches to cryptography in the quantum setting are as important as ever (and so will be they). Actually, there are several results on quantum computational cryptography from the complexity-theoretic point of view [10, 8, 7, 28] .
As we mentioned, many underlying problems can be efficiently solved by quantum adversary. In order to establish cryptosystems secure against quantum adversary, it is necessary to search for new underlying problems proper for quantum computational cryptography. We know that we have not found any efficient quantum algorithms for some problems such as the subset sum (knapsack) problem and the shortest vector problem. Thus, quantum adversaries are currently ineffective in the attack on lattice-based cryptography [3, 30] and knapsack-based cryptography [17, 28] .
In this paper, we take a new underlying problem proper for quantum computational cryptography and study theoretical properties of the problem. The problem is a distinction problem between quantum states which is a natural generalization of distinction problems between probability distributions, which are commonly used in computational cryptography [12, 5, 33] . We consider the following generalization:
Quantum State Computational Distinguishability for (ρ 1 , ρ 0 ): (QSCD for (ρ 1 , ρ 0 )) input: quantum string χ; promise: χ ∈ {ρ 1 , ρ 0 } (ρ 0 = ρ 1 ); output: "YES" if χ = ρ 1 , and "NO" otherwise.
Our problem is defined as a quantum state computational distinguishability problem between a random coset state ρ π with a hidden (fully flipped) permutation π ∈ S n and a maximally mixed state ι (or, the uniform distribution) over S n , where S n is the symmetric group over n elements. These quantum states are written as
where π ∈ K n , K n is the set of all the permutations π over n elements (n is even) such that π is of order 2 and does not include any fixed points. The parameter n is used to measure the computational complexity of our problem and called security parameter in the context of cryptography. Note that the binary representation of any permutation is at most O(n log n). With these quantum states, our problem QSCD ff is specified as follows:
input: quantum string χ; promise: χ ∈ {ρ ⊗l(n) π , ι ⊗l(n) }, where l(n) is a polynomial in n;
π , and "NO" otherwise, where l(n) is a polynomial in n.
Our Contributions
Throughout this paper, we show cryptographic properties of the QSCD ff problem and its application. Our contributions are summarized as follows: (1) QSCD ff has the trapdoor property. Namely, given the hidden permutation π, QSCD ff is efficiently computable. (2) With respect to the selection of π ∈ K n , the averagecase hardness of QSCD ff perfectly coincides with its worst-case hardness. (3) The computational complexity of QSCD ff is lower-bounded by the worst-case hardness of the Graph Automorphism (GA) problem, which is defined as Graph Automorphism Problem: (GA) input: an undirected graph G = (V, E); output: "YES" if G has a non-trivial automorphism, and "NO" otherwise.
(4) We consider an easier problem AuxQSCD ff than QSCD ff as follows:
where l(n) and l ′ (n) are polynomials in n. (In the rest of this paper, we suppose that l(n) and l ′ (n) are arbitrary polynomials in n.) Similarly to QSCD ff , we have the following. (4a) The average-case hardness of AuxQSCD ff perfectly coincides with its worst-case hardness. (4b) The computational complexity of AuxQSCD ff is lower-bounded by the worst-case hardness of the Graph Automorphism problem. (5) Based on QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff , we can construct an asymmetric-key encryption scheme. Namely, if there exists a quantum adversary that can crack such a scheme, then QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff are also efficiently computable by quantum computers.
Related Works
This paper is a study on computational properties of quantum states and the study is along a recent research direction in the quantum computational complexity theory. Actually, the notion of statistical distinguishability between quantum states was already investigated in the context of quantum zero-knowledge proofs by Watrous [32] and Kobayashi [20] . Their papers defined computational problems for the statistical distinguishability between quantum states, and showed complexity-theoretic results on several classes of quantum zero-knowledge proofs. Also, Aharonov and Ta-Shma [1] studied the computational complexity of quantum state generation, and showed relations among quantum adiabatic computing, statistical zero-knowledge, and quantum state generation. This paper deals with "computational" properties of quantum states, and we thus make computational comparisons between our problem QSCD ff and other underlying problems for computational cryptography. In the following, we discuss advantageous points to our problem QSCD ff from different viewpoints.
Exponential-time vs. Subexponential-time. The hidden subgroup problem (HSP) has intensively been studied as a central issue of quantum computation to investigate both positive and negative aspects of the power of quantum algorithms. The essential parts of the integer factorization problem (IFP) and the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) can be regarded as special cases of HSP on abelian groups, AHSP for short, and Kitaev [19] showed that AHSP can be solved efficiently by introducing a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the quantum Fourier transform on abelian groups, which is a generalization of the original quantum Fourier transform in [31] . Although AHSP can be efficiently solved, HSP for general non-abelian groups seems to be hard to solve efficiently only with known techniques. (HSPs on some special non-abelian groups are studied well [11, 16, 13, 29, 22, 27] .) In particular, HSP on the dihedral group (DHSP) has received much attention since Regev [29] showed a quantum reduction from the unique shortest vector problem (uSVP) to a slightly different variant of DHSP. Note that uSVP is used in lattice-based public-key cryptosystems [3, 30] . Also note that there exists a subexponential-time quantum algorithm for DHSP due to Kuperberg [22] . These two results do not straightforwardly imply a subexponential-time quantum algorithm for uSVP, but may bring a clue to find another subexponential-time quantum algorithm. On the other hand, our problem QSCD ff is closely related to HSP on the symmetric group (SHSP). For SHSP, no subexponential-time quantum algorithm is known so far. Hallgren, Russell and Ta-Shma [16] considered a similar problem to ours in terms of SHSP and showed that it takes exponential time for any standard algorithms 1 to solve SHSP. Their technique is applicable to our problem and we can say that the standard algorithms to solve our problem essentially require exponential time. After that, their hardness result was strengthened by Grigni et al. [13] and Kempe and Shalev [18] . We would like to stress that if QSCD ff is computable by an efficient quantum algorithm then the techniques used in the algorithm will bring us a breakthrough in the research of quantum computation. We may say that these results support the non-existence of subexponential-time quantum algorithms for SHSP. In this sense, our problem QSCD ff is more reliable than uSVP. This situation is similar to the case of DLP over different groups in the classical computation. While DLP over Z * p (p is a prime) is classically solvable in subexponential time, no subexponential classical algorithm for DLP over groups used in elliptic curve cryptography is known. Based on this fact, DLP over groups used in elliptic curve cryptography is believed to be more reliable than DLP over Z * p in the classical computation. Average-case Hardness vs. Worst-case Hardness. In general, if there exists a worst-case efficient algorithm for some problem then the problem also can be solved efficiently on average. Thus, it is more desirable that the security of some cryptographic system is based on the worst-case hardness of its underlying problem. Ajtai [2] found a remarkable connection between the average-case and the worst-case hardness for some versions of the shortest vector problem (SVP). He constructed a reduction from the problem to approximate the shortest vector in a given n-dimensional lattice in the worst case to the problem to approximate the shortest vector in a random lattice over certain class of lattices with larger polynomial approximation factor in n. The gaps of the average-case/worst-case hardness are also studied well. The best result is given by Micciancio [26] and the average-case/worst-case connection factor of approximately n 3 .
On the other hand, we will see that the average-case complexity of our problem QSCD ff is completely equal to its worst-case complexity. Note that though DLP has a similar property in the classical computation because of its random self-reducibility, the random reduction keeps its underlying structure and there are many underlying structures per any fixed security parameter. That is, to be exact, the case of DLP is different from the case of QSCD ff , since QSCD ff has the unique underlying structure per security parameter n.
For other general problems including the subset sum problem, it seems to hard to show that there exist some meaningful connections between the average-case hardness and the worst-case hardness. Typically saying, no cryptographic systems based on the worst-case hardness of the subset sum problem or its subproblems are known so far.
Cryptographic Properties
We investigate several cryptographic properties of QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff in this section. These properties enable us to construct cryptographic systems. In what follows, we assume that the reader is familiar with basics of quantum computation.
Trapdoor Property
We first prove that QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff have the trapdoor property by constructing an efficient distinction algorithm between ρ π and ι with the hidden permutation π.
Theorem 1 [Distinction Algorithm with Trapdoor Information]
Given π ∈ K n , there exists a polynomialtime quantum algorithm that distinguishes ρ π from ι with success probability at least 1/2 and one-sided error.
Proof. Let χ be a given unknown state, which is either ρ π or ι. We give a distinction algorithm in the following.
(D1) Prepare a quantum register for a control bit, and apply the Hadamard transformation to the register.
That is, the initial state of the system is H|0 0|H ⊗ χ. (D2) Apply controlled-π C π to the both registers.
• Case 1: χ = ρ π . Since π 2 = id for any π ∈ K n , we can represent the whole state in the first and second registers as χ = 1 n! σ∈Sn |ψ π,σ ψ π,σ |, where
• Case 2: χ = ι. Similarly to Case 1, we can represent the whole state as χ =
(D3) Apply the Hadamard transformation to the first register, and measure the first register. If the result is 0, output "YES". Otherwise, output "NO".
• Case 1.
we observe 0 with probability 1 when measuring the first register.
and π is non-trivial, we observe 0 with probability 1/2 when measuring the first register.
As a direct consequence of this algorithm, we can efficiently solve QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff if we know the hidden permutation π.
Corollary 1 There exist polynomial-time quantum algorithms that solve l(n)-QSCD ff and (l(n), l ′ (n))-AuxQSCD ff using π with probability at least 1 − 1/2 l(n) .
Reduction from the Worst Case to the Average Case
We next show reductions from the worst case to the average case for QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff .
Theorem 2 Suppose that there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A that solves l(n)-QSCD ff on average for π ∈ K n with non-negligible probability, i.e.,
for some polynomial p(n), where π is chosen uniformly at random from K n and the subscript A denotes the random variable induced by measuring the final outputting state of A in the computational basis. Then we can construct a polynomial-time quantum algorithm B that solves l(n)-QSCD ff for any π ∈ K n with non-negligible probability, i.e.,
Proof. Suppose A is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that, given π ∈ K n uniformly at random, solves l(n)-QSCD ff with non-negligible probability. Let χ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ χ l(n) be a given state, where
or ι ⊗l(n) . We can construct the worst-case algorithm B as follows.
(R1) Choose τ ∈ S n uniformly at random, and act τ to a given χ i on the right for all i. Then we obtain χ
(R2) Invoke the algorithm A with χ
We can see easily that τ −1 πτ is uniformly distributed over the conjugacy class of π and the conjugacy class is actually equal to K n . Therefore, the input χ
to algorithm A satisfies the condition on which A works well.
Using the same argument, we can also construct the similar reduction for (l(n), l ′ (n))-AuxQSCD ff .
Theorem 3
If there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A that solves (l(n), l ′ (n))-AuxQSCD ff on average for π ∈ K n with non-negligible probability, then we can construct a quantum polynomial-time algorithm B that solves (l(n), l ′ (n))-AuxQSCD ff for any π ∈ K n with non-negligible probability.
Lower Bound of the Hardness
In this section, we show complexity-theoretical lower bounds of QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff by showing reductions from GA to them. Before giving proofs, we consider a few technical issues. The first ones are definitions of variants of GA. Köbler, Schöning and Torán [21] introduced Unique Graph Automorphism Problem (UniqueGA), defined as follows.
Unique Graph Automorphism Problem: (UniqueGA) input: an undirected graph G = (V, E); promise: G has a unique non-trivial automorphism or no non-trivial automorphisms; output: "YES" if G has a non-trivial automorphism, and "NO" otherwise.
(The above problem is called (1GA, GA) as a promise problem in [21] .) We also consider the following subproblem.
Unique Graph Automorphism with Fully Flipped Permutation: (UniqueGA ff ) input: an undirected graph G = (V, E), where |V | = n is even; promise: G has a non-trivial automorphism π ∈ K n , or no non-trivial automorphisms; output: "YES" if G has the non-trivial automorphism π, and "NO" otherwise.
The second is the so-called coset sampling. (See, e.g., [29] .)
Lemma 1 [Coset Sampling]
Given an instance G of UniqueGA ff , we can generate a quantum state ρ π if G is an "YES" instance with the non-trivial automorphism π, or ι if G is a "NO" instance in polynomial time.
Proof. Given an instance G of UniqueGA ff , we can easily prepare the quantum state 1 √ n! σ∈Sn |σ |σ(G) , where σ(G) is the resulting graph by relabeling the nodes according to the permutation σ. By discarding the second register, we can obtain a quantum state χ in the first register. Then, χ = ρ π if G is an "YES" instance with the unique non-trivial automorphism π and χ = ι otherwise.
The last is a generation algorithm of ρ π , utilized not only in the reductions, also in an application shown in Sec. 3.
Lemma 2 [Generation Algorithm for ρ π ] Given π ∈ K n , there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm to generate the state ρ π with certainty.
Proof. The following is the generation algorithm, which is applied to three registers.
(G1) Choose a permutation from S n uniformly at random and store it in the second register. Then the state of the system is 1 n! σ∈Sn |0 0||σ σ||0 0|.
(G2) Apply the Hadamard transformation to the first register: For a fixed random permutation σ,
(G3) Apply the controlled-π to the first and second registers, and then copy the content of the second register to the third:
σ∈Sn (|0 |σ |σ + |1 |σπ |σπ ). (G4) Apply the controlled-π to the first and second registers, again:
Discard the first and second registers and output the state in the third register.
We are now ready to present reductions from GA to QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff .
Theorem 4
If there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A that solves l(n)-QSCD ff with non-negligible probability, then we can construct a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for GA with non-negligible probability.
Proof. We first show that GA is polynomial-time Turing equivalent to the UniqueGA ff and then we give a reduction from UniqueGA ff to QSCD ff . The reduction from GA to UniqueGA ff can be completed by a similar reduction shown in [21] . Köbler, Schöning and Torán [21] also showed a polynomial-time Turing reduction from GA to UniqueGA. Carefully reading the construction of the reduction, we can see that they essentially showed a reduction from GA to UniqueGA ff . They constructed a polynomial-time algorithm for GA by invoking UniqueGA oracle with promised input, a graph with even number of nodes which has either no non-trivial automorphisms or the unique non-trivial automorphism without fixed points. Thus, we can immediately finish the following lemma from this fact.
Lemma 3 UniqueGA ff is polynomial-time Turing equivalent
2 to GA.
Hence, it suffices that we show a reduction from UniqueGA ff to QSCD ff . By repeating applications of Lemma 1 l(n) times, we obtain ρ ⊗l(n) π or ι ⊗l(n) , which completes the reduction.
The next is the reduction from GA to AuxQSCD ff . This reduction will be utilized in order to show a reduction in our asymmetric-key encryption scheme. To prove this lower bound, we exploit a quantum extension of the hybrid argument in the proof.
Theorem 5
If there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A that solves (l(n), l ′ (n))-AuxQSCD ff with non-negligible probability, there also exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for GA with non-negligible probability.
Proof. Let p(n) be a polynomial such that
(Note that there exists such a polynomial by the assumption of A.) It suffices that we show a reduction from UniqueGA ff to the average case of AuxQSCD ff by Theorem 3 and Lemma 3. As shown in Theorem 4, we can easily generate ρ
a given instance G of UniqueGA ff by Lemma 1. However, the given quantum algorithm A is only guaranteed to be able to distinguish ρ
. Our approach is to examine which property the quantum algorithm A has, (A) or (B), where (A) A can distinguish the correct auxiliary input ρ
2 If a Turing reduction to a promise problem makes only queries that satisfy the promise, it is called smart [14] . The reduction from GA to UniqueGA is actually smart and therefore so is this reduction.
and (B)
A cannot distinguish them with sufficiently large probability, i.e., the above inequality does not hold.
, we can efficiently solve UniqueGA ff by generating ι ⊗l(n) using random sampling and ρ ⊗l ′ (n) π or ι l ′ (n) from a given instance using the coset sampling shown in Lemma 1. When A satisfies (B), it can actually distinguish ρ
can expect that it works correctly whether given ι
as the auxiliary input. We precisely describe the above ideas in the rest of this proof.
We first determine whether A satisfies (A) or (B) by the following procedure.
(E1) Choose σ ∈ K n uniformly at random. (E2) Generate ι ⊗2l(n)+l ′ (n) by sampling from S n uniformly at random.
(E5) Repeat (E1)-(E4) 8np(n) 2 times, independently. Let a 1 and a 2 be the numbers of the outputted "1" when
to A and when we give
we determine that A satisfies the property (A) and it satisfies the property (B), otherwise.
Note that this examination succeeds with probability 1 − o(1) by the Hoeffding bound. When A satisfies the property (A), as mentioned at the beginning of this proof, we can solve UniqueGA ff with non-negligible probability. On the other hand, when A satisfies the property (B), we need to perform another procedure for the property (B). Then we have
We define three events,
.
By the triangle inequality,
with non-negligible probability. Since we can generate ρ
from a given instance of UniqueGA ff by Lemma 1, we have a polynomial-time quantum algorithm B that solve UniqueGA ff with non-negligible probability. This completes the proof.
An Application: Asymmetric-Key Encryption Scheme
We exploit several properties of QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff that have been seen in the previous section and present an asymmetric-key encryption scheme. We will see that its security can be based on the worst-case hardness of QSCD ff or AuxQSCD ff by Theorems 2 and 3. Several models of quantum counterpart for asymmetric-key cryptosystems are possible 3 . Thus, we consider the following scenario: Alice, the sender, would like to send securely a (classical) message to Bob, the receiver, through a quantum channel. We assume that Alice and Bob have practical quantum computers, i.e., polynomialtime quantum Turing machines. Firstly, Bob utilizes his own quantum repository to keep his quantum states, i.e., encryption keys. Note that anyone can access Bob's repository and obtain his encryption keys. Alice accesses the repository to obtain the encryption keys to encrypt her message. Now, we assume that Eve, the adversary, can pick up the encrypted messages from the quantum channel, and tries to extract the original message using her quantum computer, i.e., polynomial-time quantum Turing machine. Since Eve can also obtain Bob's encryption keys from his repository as well as Alice's, she can try to distinguish the encryptions with polynomially many samples of the encryption keys. The protocol to transmit a message using our asymmetric-key encryption scheme consists of two phases: the key transmission phase and the message transmission phase. Eve attacks the scheme during the message transmission phase to reveal a content of the encrypted message. First, we will give a reduction from such Eve's attack to the worst-case hardness of QSCD ff . Next, we consider Eve's attacks in the key transmission phase. By improving our protocol, we show that if Eve then perform the projective measurement for the encryption keys in the computational basis, Eve's measurement for the encryption keys can be detected with high probability 4 .
We now describe the protocol of our asymmetric-key encryption scheme as follows. respectively, and sends it to Bob. (A5) Bob decrypts Alice's message using the decryption key π.
Step (A1) can be easily done by uniformly choosing transpositions one by one such that each transposition is distinct from the others and composing the product of the transpositions.
Step (A4) is just the encryption procedure in which Alice sends a concatenation of l(n) encryption keys or l(n) uniformly random states according to the bit she wants to send. To Steps (A2) and (A5), we directly apply Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, respectively. For Eve's attack at the message transmission, we can prove the following proposition directly by the definition of AuxQSCD ff .
Proposition 1
If there exists a polynomial-time quantum adversary E for the message transmission phase such that for any polynomial l ′ (n) which is the number of the encryption keys in use by E, there exists a polynomial
when the decryption key π is chosen uniformly at random from K n , then there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves (l(n), l ′ (n))-AuxQSCD ff with non-negligible probability.
More consideration to our scheme will be given in Appendix.
Concluding Remarks
We have studied two computational distinguishability problems QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff and revealed their properties for cryptographic purposes. It would be more interesting to find other quantum states of which computational distinguishability has nice properties for cryptographic constructions, and construct new cryptosystems with quantum-specific advantages by the computational distinguishability. Although we have showed reductions from GA to QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff , it seems that there are gaps of the hardness between GA and them since our two problems discard the combinatorial structures of graphs unlike GA. Thus, it might be possible to characterize the hardness by other harder (group-theoretic) problems such as the problems of finding a centralizer and a normalizer, given in [24] .
Finally, we stress that QSCD ff and AuxQSCD ff look quite difficult to solve, because an efficient quantum algorithm for QSCD ff or AuxQSCD ff brings a breakthrough in the research of quantum computation. Several models of quantum counterpart for asymmetric-key cryptography are possible. We list such models in the following.
CQC model Legal players (i.e., sender and receiver) are classical; adversary is quantum; the channel is classical. QQC model Legal players and adversary are quantum; channel is classical. QQQ model Legal players and adversary are quantum; channel is also quantum.
QQQ1 model Ciphertext is quantum.
QQQ2 model Ciphertext and keys are quantum.
The most practical model is CQC model, because the system works on current computers and also the system could be secure against quantum adversary. Okamoto, Tanaka and Uchiyama proposed a quantum public-key cryptosystem [28] and the system is of QQC model. Our scheme is of QQQ2 model because keys are quantum. Though QQQ2 model is the least practical one, we would like to stress that QQQ2 model has a remarkable (quantum) characteristic. Suppose that there are two types of adversary: quantum and classical. Also suppose that all classical adversaries for quantum states can do is computation after projective measurements (in the computational basis) of the quantum states. In this sense, some schemes of QQQ2 model could be classical information theoretically secure. Our scheme satisfies this property.
B Diagram for Our Asymmetric-Key Encryption Scheme C More Consideration
In this section, we allow Eve to measure Bob's encryption keys at the key transmission phase. Since the encryption keys are quantum, these keys may collapse to classical states by Eve's measurement. Therefore, we need to consider avoiding the influence of collapse of encryption keys caused by Eve. For simplicity, we consider the case where some of quantum encryption keys collapse to completely classical states.
For a countermeasure against the collapse of encryption keys, we modify our protocol. This protocol has new encryption and decryption algorithms slightly different from the original ones. Actually, we can construct the modified protocol only by replacing Steps (A4) and (A5) in the original protocol with the following: (A4') Alice encrypts 0 or 1 intoι orρ π respectively using the Modified Encryption Algorithm, and sends the encryption to Bob. Here,ι andρ π are concatenations of l(n) + m(n) states, as defined in the algorithm. (A5') Bob decrypts her message using the Modified Decryption Algorithm with the decryption key π.
